2 research outputs found

    Fast Reed-Solomon Interactive Oracle Proofs of Proximity

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    The family of Reed-Solomon (RS) codes plays a prominent role in the construction of quasilinear probabilistically checkable proofs (PCPs) and interactive oracle proofs (IOPs) with perfect zero knowledge and polylogarithmic verifiers. The large concrete computational complexity required to prove membership in RS codes is one of the biggest obstacles to deploying such PCP/IOP systems in practice. To advance on this problem we present a new interactive oracle proof of proximity (IOPP) for RS codes; we call it the Fast RS IOPP (FRI) because (i) it resembles the ubiquitous Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) and (ii) the arithmetic complexity of its prover is strictly linear and that of the verifier is strictly logarithmic (in comparison, FFT arithmetic complexity is quasi-linear but not strictly linear). Prior RS IOPPs and PCPs of proximity (PCPPs) required super-linear proving time even for polynomially large query complexity. For codes of block-length N, the arithmetic complexity of the (interactive) FRI prover is less than 6 * N, while the (interactive) FRI verifier has arithmetic complexity <= 21 * log N, query complexity 2 * log N and constant soundness - words that are delta-far from the code are rejected with probability min{delta * (1-o(1)),delta_0} where delta_0 is a positive constant that depends mainly on the code rate. The particular combination of query complexity and soundness obtained by FRI is better than that of the quasilinear PCPP of [Ben-Sasson and Sudan, SICOMP 2008], even with the tighter soundness analysis of [Ben-Sasson et al., STOC 2013; ECCC 2016]; consequently, FRI is likely to facilitate better concretely efficient zero knowledge proof and argument systems. Previous concretely efficient PCPPs and IOPPs suffered a constant multiplicative factor loss in soundness with each round of "proof composition" and thus used at most O(log log N) rounds. We show that when delta is smaller than the unique decoding radius of the code, FRI suffers only a negligible additive loss in soundness. This observation allows us to increase the number of "proof composition" rounds to Theta(log N) and thereby reduce prover and verifier running time for fixed soundness

    Scalable, transparent, and post-quantum secure computational integrity

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    Human dignity demands that personal information, like medical and forensic data, be hidden from the public. But veils of secrecy designed to preserve privacy may also be abused to cover up lies and deceit by parties entrusted with Data, unjustly harming citizens and eroding trust in central institutions. Zero knowledge (ZK) proof systems are an ingenious cryptographic solution to the tension between the ideals of personal privacy and institutional integrity, enforcing the latter in a way that does not compromise the former. Public trust demands transparency from ZK systems, meaning they be set up with no reliance on any trusted party, and have no trapdoors that could be exploited by powerful parties to bear false witness. For ZK systems to be used with Big Data, it is imperative that the public verification process scale sublinearly in data size. Transparent ZK proofs that can be verified exponentially faster than data size were first described in the 1990s but early constructions were impractical, and no ZK system realized thus far in code (including that used by crypto-currencies like Zcash) has achieved both transparency and exponential verification speedup, simultaneously, for general computations. Here we report the first realization of a transparent ZK system (ZK-STARK) in which verification scales exponentially faster than database size, and moreover, this exponential speedup in verification is observed concretely for meaningful and sequential computations, described next. Our system uses several recent advances on interactive oracle proofs (IOP), such as a “fast” (linear time) IOP system for error correcting codes. Our proof-of-concept system allows the Police to prove to the public that the DNA profile of a Presidential Candidate does not appear in the forensic DNA profile database maintained by the Police. The proof, which is generated by the Police, relies on no external trusted party, and reveals no further information about the contents of the database, nor about the candidate’s profile; in particular, no DNA information is disclosed to any party outside the Police. The proof is shorter than the size of the DNA database, and verified faster than the time needed to examine that database naively
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